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We investigate the performane of a ontinuous variable (CV) quantum key distribution (QKD)
sheme in a pratial setting. More speially, we take non-ideal error reoniliation proedure
into aount. The quantum hannel onneting the two honest parties is assumed to be lossy but
noiseless. Seret key rates are given for the ase that the measurement outomes are postseleted or a
reverse reoniliation sheme is applied. The reverse reoniliation sheme loses its initial advantage
in the pratial setting. If one ombines postseletion with reverse reoniliation however, muh of
this advantage an be reovered.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.50.-p, 89.70.+
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two parties,
the sender Alie and the reeiver Bob, to share a key
whih is provably seure against any attak by an eaves-
dropper (Eve), who may have superior omputational
and tehnologial power. Pratial implementations of
QKD use weak laser pulses, whih an be easily on-
trolled, or parametri down-onversion soures. These
soures are used together with single-photon detetors to
realize QKD. For a review see [1℄. Reently, it has been
proposed to employ quadrature measurements of optial
modes as detetion devies, thereby introduing what is
known as ontinuous variable (CV) QKD [2, 3, 4, 5, 6℄.
Some of these shemes use non-lassial states, while
others use oherent laser pulses. The aim is to exploit
the high repetition rates of homodyne detetion to over-
ome the limitation in detetion rate that is typial for
single-photon ounting at standard teleom wavelength
although reently other approahes using frequeny on-
version have been reported [7, 8℄.
In the presene of loss, it seems to be impossible at rst
sight to distill a seret key if the transmission falls below
50% (3dB loss) [9℄. The reasoning is that Eve an replae
the lossy hannel with an ideal one and use a beamsplit-
ter to tap o Alie's signals to simulate the losses. She
then obtains the stronger signals whenever the losses are
bigger than 50%. This apparent advantage of Eve an be
ounterated as it holds only on average, whether Alie
and Bob are losely or loosely orrelated. Alie and Bob
an use postseletion (PS) to retain only those events
where they are losely orrelated and then have some ad-
vantage over Eve. The distillation of a seret key rate is
then possible for any transmittane of the quantum han-
nel [10℄. Another way to irumvent the 3dB loss limit
is to use a suitable one-way information reoniliation
proedure. If one builds up the key from Bob's measured
data rather than from Alie's signals, Eve always has less
information about Bob's measurement result than Alie
does. This tehnique is known as reverse reoniliation
(RR) [2, 11℄ and leads to positive seret key rates for an
arbitrary loss of the quantum hannel [12, 13℄.
There are several ways to extend this senario to a
more realisti one. First, one ould onsider quantum
hannels that are not only lossy, but also impose exess
Gaussian noise on the quadrature distributions, as is seen
in experiments. For any exess hannel noise δ, as seen
by Bob, there exists a lower limit for the tolerable single-
photon transmittivity η, whih is given by [14℄
δ < 2η . (1)
If the losses are higher, one an show that the data an be
explained as originating from an interept resend attak.
In this senario, no seret key an be distilled [15, 16℄.
In aordane with this bound, it has been shown that
the key rate obtained from PS-shemes dereases with
inreasing exess noise [17℄.
Here we follow another diretion to extend the work of
[10, 12℄ and stik to the assumption of a lossy but noise-
less quantum hannel. This senario an be justied sine
detetor noise is the dominant ontribution to the total
noise seen in the experiment [18℄. In a trusted devie se-
nario one an assume that Eve annot exploit the noise
of Bob's detetors. The remaining hannel noise, whih
an leak information to Eve, is typially less than one
perent [19℄ and an thus be negleted in a rst approxi-
mation. Similarly, in standard QKD with weak oherent
pulses, the assumption of lossy but noiseless quantum
hannels together with detetor dark ounts whih are
inaessible to Eve lead to a very good approximation to
the rigorous seure key rate. In this senario we investi-
gate the impliations of the fat that any error orretion
sheme in a real-world appliation annot reah the fun-
damental performane limit given by Shannon [20℄. The
aim of this artile is to ompare the performane of re-
verse reoniliation and postseleted shemes where the
error orreting arries a non-negligible overhead in the
amount of neessary ommuniation.
This paper is organized as follows: In the rst se-
tion, we introdue the investigated protool and give the
framework to whih our eieny analysis applies. Next
we alulate a lower bound on the seret key rate under
2the assumption that the quantum hannel between Alie
and Bob is lossy but noiseless and Eve is restrited to ol-
letive attaks. It turns out that Eve's information about
the key an be deomposed into eetive binary hannels.
Her information gain per use of suh a binary hannel is
omputed in setion III A for the protool using diret
reoniliation (DR) and for the reverse reoniled proto-
ol (RR) in setion III B. Afterwards, we alulate the
total seret key rates for the various protools and in-
lude the possibility to use postseletion (PS). We then
proeed by inluding ineient but trusted detetors on
Bob's side in our analysis in setion IV. Details about the
numerial optimization of the seret key rates are given
in setion V. In the last setion we onlude and disuss
our results.
II. PROTOCOL AND BEAMSPLITTER
ATTACK
We onsider the situation where Alie sends pure sig-
nal states |φi〉 through the quantum hannel to Bob, who
an verify, for example by performing tomographi om-
plete measurements, that he indeed always reeives pure
onditional states as expeted in the absene of hannel
noise |Ψi〉 [26℄. It follows that the bipartite state of Eve
and Bob has to be a produt state. In the senario of ol-
letive attaks, the ation of the hannel an be modeled
by a unitary oupling to an anilla system aessible to
Eve, whih is prepared in some standard state |ǫ0〉. The
absene of noise allows to fully haraterize Eve's attak.
We have
U |φi〉|ǫ0〉 = |Ψi〉|ǫi〉.
Sine U is unitary, we have
〈φi|φj〉 = 〈Ψi|Ψj〉〈ǫi|ǫj〉,
where 〈φi|φj〉 is given by the state preparation and
〈Ψi|Ψj〉 is xed by Bob's observation. Therefore the over-
laps 〈ǫi|ǫj〉, whih ontain all of Eve's information about
the signals, are xed.
In our protool, Alie enodes her bit-value into the
modulation of two oherent states aording to
|0〉 = |α〉
|1〉 = |−α〉,
with the oherent amplitude α hosen to be real without
loss of generality. The states are sent with equal a priori
probabilities p0 = p1 =
1
2 . Bob performs a heterodyne
measurement on the reeived states, whih is mathemat-
ially equivalent to a projetion onto a oherent state
|β〉 = |βx + iβy〉. From that he is able to onlude that
he indeed reeived pure states. That in turn xes Eve's
knowledge about the signal states. Furthermore, if Bob
reeives attenuated oherent states |±√ηα〉, the states
that Eve holds have to be unitarily equivalent to those
obtainable by the beamsplitter attak. The input states
are transformed aording to
|±α〉 → |±√ηα〉B ⊗ |±
√
1− ηα〉E (2)
in this attak. After measuring the signals, Bob assigns
the bit-value 0 (1), if βx is positive (negative) and then
publily announes βy and the modulus of βx of the mea-
sured β. As we will see, this announement will enable
us to deompose the protool into eetive binary infor-
mation hannels.
III. LOWER BOUND ON SECRET KEY RATE
After the exhange of quantum signals between Alie
and Bob is omplete, they proeed with a lassial post-
proessing phase in whih they orret for errors in their
bit-strings and ut out Eve's knowledge about the key
(privay ampliation)[21℄. To do so, they need to trans-
mit information though an authentiated but otherwise
inseure lassial hannel. Eve may listen and use any in-
formation exhanged over the publi hannel to optimize
her attak.
Alie and Bob may use the lassial hannel only in
one diretion for error orretion. This will result in two
non-equivalent ways of distilling a seret key from their
shared lassial data. Communiation from Alie to Bob
is ommon in QKD and we will refer to it as diret reon-
iliation (DR), whereas ommuniation in the opposite
diretion is alled reverse reoniliation (RR) [2℄. The
seret key is built from the data that the sender in the
lassial ommuniation step holds. In any ase, Eve's
knowledge is summarized in quantum states ρi ondi-
tioned on bit-values held by the person who transmits
the error orretion information. Her knowledge about
the data an be quantied by the Holevo quantity χ [22℄,
given by
χ = S(ρ)−
1∑
i=0
piS(ρi) (3)
ρ =
1∑
i=0
piρi,
whih inludes Eve being allowed to measure out her an-
illas olletively. It turns out [23℄ that the seret key rate
G in this olletive attak senario will then be bounded
from below by
G ≥ IA:B − χ . (4)
Note that we have replaed the Holevo quantity between
Alie and Bob in theorem 1 of [23℄ by the lassial mutual
Information IA:B, sine we are investigating a pratial
QKD sheme with our speied measurement setup.
Next, we will evaluate IA:B and χ for dierent protools
and noiseless detetors.
3A. Mutual information between Alie and Bob
After the quantum states are distributed and mea-
sured, Alie and Bob share lassial orrelated bit-
strings. The mutual information IA:B between the two
honest parties is determined by the onditional probabil-
ities that Bob projets onto β. These are given by
p(β|0) = 1
π
e
−
(
(βx−√ηα)2+β2y
)
(5)
p(β|1) = 1
π
e
−
(
(βx+
√
ηα)2+β2y
)
.
Sine Eve is only performing an individual oupling of
the signals to her anilla systems, Bob's measurement
outomes β for dierent signals are independent. The
mutual information IA:B between Alie and Bob annot
depend on the value of βy, sine the agreement on a bit-
value does not depend on it. Furthermore, the total prob-
ability that Bob obtains the measurement outome βx is
given by
p(βx) =
∫ ∞
−∞
dβy p(β) = (6)
=
1
2
√
π
(
e−(βx+
√
ηα)
2
+ e−(βx−
√
ηα)
2
)
.
From this we see that the two outomes ±βx our with
the same probability. It follows that the announement of
βy and |βx| denes an eetive binary information han-
nel. The probability e+ that Bob assigns the wrong bit-
value for a given positive value of βx > 0 is given by
e+ =
p (βx|1)
p (βx|0) + p (βx|1) ,
whereas the orresponding error probability e− for neg-
ative outomes βx < 0 is given by
e− =
p (βx|0)
p (βx|0) + p (βx|1) .
From Eqn. (5) it follows that
e+ = e− = e =
1
1 + e4
√
ηα|βx| , (7)
so that the eetive information hannels are symmetri
in the error rate. Eah information hannel ontributes
an amount of 1−Hbin(e) to the mutual information, IA:B,
where Hbin(e) is the entropy of the binary symmetri
hannel,
Hbin(e) = −e log2(e)− (1− e) log2(1− e).
The probability that an eetive information hannel is
being used, is given by
pc(βx) = 2p(βx). (8)
For the total transmission we nd
IA:B =
∫ ∞
0
dβx pc(βx)
[
1−Hbin (e)] . (9)
In order to alulate the seret key rate G aording to
Eqn. (4), we proeed by bounding Eve's knowledge χ
deomposed in the eetive binary information hannels.
B. Diret reoniliation
Usually in QKD the DR ase is onsidered where the
seret key is determined by Alie's data. This means that
Alie sends Bob error orretion information in the in-
formation reoniliation step of the protool. After Alie
and Bob have orreted their bit-strings, Eve an make
use of the information transmitted over the publi han-
nel to optimize her measurements on her anilla systems.
The quantum states in Eve's hand, onditioned on Al-
ie's data, are given by (2) as
|ǫi〉 = |±
√
1− ηα〉 . (10)
These states are pure, so that we have χDR = S(ρ).
What remains to be alulated are the eigenvalues of
ρ =
1
2
(|ǫ0〉〈ǫ0|+ |ǫ1〉〈ǫ1|) .
The symmetry allows us to write the states |ǫi〉 as
|ǫ0〉 = c0|Φ0〉+ c1|Φ1〉 (11)
|ǫ1〉 = c0|Φ0〉 − c1|Φ1〉,
where the |Φi〉 are orthonormal states. A short alula-
tion shows that ρ is already diagonal in this basis with
eigenvalues |ci|2, so that the Holevo quantity is given by
χDR = S(ρ) = −
1∑
i=0
|ci|2 log
(
|ci|2
)
. (12)
The normalization of ρ
|c0|2 + |c1|2 = 1
and the overlap
|c0|2 − |c1|2 = 〈ǫ0|ǫ1〉
give the expression for the oeients
|c0|2 = 1
2
(1 + 〈ǫ0|ǫ1〉) (13)
|c1|2 = 1
2
(1− 〈ǫ0|ǫ1〉) .
The overlap of the two oherent states (10) is
〈ǫ0|ǫ1〉 = e−2(1−η)α
2
, (14)
4so that the Holevo quantity an be diretly omputed.
Sine Eve's quantum states are independent of Bob's
measurement outomes (see formula (14)), the value of
the Holevo quantity for eah eetive hannel, χDR(βx),
does not depend on β. Therefore, we nd that the total
Holevo quantity for all eetive hannels beomes
χDR = χDR(βx) . (15)
C. Reverse reoniliation
In a reverse reoniliation sheme [2℄, Bob sends error
orretion information to Alie. Therefore Eve is inter-
ested in obtaining information about Bob's measurement
results rather than Alie's signals. After Bob's announe-
ment of |βx| and βy, Eve knows whih information han-
nel is used and, depending on Bob's measurement re-
sult,that she either holds the state
ρ+ = (1− e) |ǫ0〉〈ǫ0|+ e|ǫ1〉〈ǫ1|
or
ρ− = e|ǫ0〉〈ǫ0|+ (1− e) |ǫ1〉〈ǫ1|
in her anilla system. Here e is the error rate of the ee-
tive binary information hannel (7). In order to obtain
the orret bit-value, she needs to nd out the sign of βx.
Both signs of the measurement outome our with the
same probability p(βx) of Eqn. (6), so that the proba-
bility of the eetive information hannel being used is
again pc = 2p(βx). The Holevo quantity (3) in the ase
of reverse reoniliation reads
χRR(βx) = S(ρ)− p+S(ρ+)− p−S(ρ−)
= S(ρ)− 1
2
[S(ρ+) + S(ρ−)] ,
sine the probability that Bob gets a positive (negative)
outome for a given binary information hannel, is simply
p± = 12 (see Eqn. 6). The entropy of ρ has already been
alulated and is given by Eqns. (12) and (13).
Furthermore there exists a unitary operation U (a
phase-shift of π) with
ρ+ = Uρ−U †,
so that S(ρ+) = S(ρ−). The basis states |Φi〉 of Eqn.
(11), whih are adapted to the symmetry, an again be
used to alulate S(ρ+). In this basis ρ+ reads
ρ+ =
( |c0|2 (1− 2e) c∗1c0
(1− 2e) c∗0c1 |c1|2
)
.
One an show with the help of Eqn. (13) that the eigen-
values λ1,2 of this matrix are of the form
λ1,2 =
1
2
(
1±
√
1 + 4e (e− 1) (1 − |〈ǫ0|ǫ1〉|2)
)
, (16)
so that we have expliitly given
S(ρ+) =
2∑
i=1
−λilogλi. (17)
With the help of Eqns. (12),(14), (16) and (17), the
Holevo quantity per information hannel an now be ex-
pliitly evaluated via
χRR(βx) = S(ρ)− S(ρ+). (18)
This quantity varies for the dierent eetive hannels.
D. Postseletion
We have alulated an upper bound χ of Eve's infor-
mation about the key for a given information hannel for
DR and for RR. Also, we have an expression for the total
mutual information shared between the two parties, Eqn.
(9). The total ahievable key rate per signal, as given by
Eqn. (4), an then be written as
G =
∫ ∞
0
dβx pc(βx)
[
1−Hbin (e)− χ(βx)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:∆Iideal(βx)
, (19)
where χ(βx) is given by Eqns. (12) and (15) for DR
and by formula (18) for RR. Here the sum runs over
all possible information hannels. In priniple one an
improve the performane of the protools by dismissing
hannels where ∆Iideal(βx) < 0, sine Eve learns more on
average about the signals than Bob for those values of
βx. This proedure is alled postseletion.
The key rate (19) refers to the ase where a perfet er-
ror orretion proedure is used (Shannon limit). Ideally,
in order to orret a bit-string of large length n, one has
to exhange asymptotially nHbin(e) bits over the publi
hannel. This information has to be hidden from Eve,
whih an be done in priniple by using a one-time-pad
of exatly the same length. In the end, eah use of an
information hannel with error rate e osts Hbin(e) seret
bits to enrypt the neessary error orretion information
[27℄.
It turns out that all eetive information hannels yield
a positive ontribution ∆IidealRR (βx) ≥ 0 for the RR proto-
ols in this idealized setting. This is in agreement with
the result found in [12℄. Therefore, it is possible to distill
a seret key for any transmission of the quantum han-
nel, and the performane of the RR protool annot be
improved further by using postseletion.
Pratial odes that work exatly at the Shannon limit
are not known. Eient odes work lose to that limit,
so in pratie one has to reveal more information to or-
ret one bit, i.e. f(e)Hbin(e), where f(e) represents the
eieny of the used protool (f(e) ≥ 1). The oeient
f(e), whih determines the overhead one has to pay for
realisti error orretion, depends in all pratial shemes
on the error rate e. To see how the key rateG sales when
5an error orretion sheme with eieny f(e) is used, we
an rewrite formula (19) as
G =
∫ ∞
0
dβx pc(βx)

1− f(e)Hbin(e)− χ(βx)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:∆Iprac(βx)

 .(20)
The quantity χ(βx) is again given by Eqns. (12) and (15)
in the DR and by (18) in the RR ase respetively. Post-
seletion an again be applied one Alie and Bob know
the eieny f(e) of their error orretion proedure ap-
proximately. Thus postseletion now is relevant not only
for DR, but also for the RR senario.
IV. DETECTOR NOISE
By now we have obtained seret key rates while ne-
gleting any kind of noise. While experiments show that
the hannel noise is low, the noise of the detetor is not
negligible, but of the order of 0.1 shot noise units. In a
trusted devie senario we assume that Eve annot ma-
nipulate the detetor noise to leak information about the
signals to her. On the other hand, this noise inreases
the ost of error orretion. It is interesting to see how
this aets the key rate. We dene the exess noise δ
imposed by the detetor by
δ =
∆2obsβx
∆2SNLβx
− 1, (21)
where ∆2obsβx is the observed variane of βx seen in ex-
periments and ∆2SNLβx is the shot noise limited variane
of βx. The probability that Bob obtains the measurement
outome βx is then given by
pDet(βx) = (22)
1
2
√
π(1 + δ)
(
e
−(βx+√ηα)2
1+δ + e
−(βx−√ηα)2
1+δ
)
,
inluding detetor noise. This leads to a modied error
rate of the eient binary hannels, given by
eDet =
1
1 + e
4
√
ηα|βx|
1+δ
. (23)
The seret key rate an then be alulated as desribed
in the previous setions for any value of the exess noise
δ, one has only to use the modied expressions for Bob's
probability distribution (22) and for the error rate (23)
instead of Eqns. (6) and (7) in all preeding formulas.
This will lead to a derease of the mutual information
IAB between Alie and Bob with growing exess noise δ
to aount for the higher ost of error orretion. While
the ost of privay ampliation χDR per use of an ef-
fetive binary information hannel in the DR protool
(15) is unaeted by the detetor noise, the orrespond-
ing quantity χRR (18) for the RR protool dereases with
inreasing detetor noise. This eet originates from the
fat that Eve is more unertain about Bob's measurement
outomes if he uses ineient detetors.
e f(e)
0.01 1.16
0.05 1.16
0.1 1.22
0.15 1.32
TABLE I: Eieny of Casade [24℄ for dierent values of
the error rate e
V. NUMERICAL PROCEDURE FOR
CALCULATING THE KEY RATE
Now we have everything at hand to ompute G. For
this, we resort to numerial alulations. We assume that
our error orretion an work as eiently as the bidi-
retional protool Casade [24℄. To be preise, we use a
linear t of the eieny of Casade (see table I) for the
funtion f(e) in our numerial optimization. Formally,
one-way ommuniation would be needed to justify the
use of the Devetak-Winter bound (4). However in the
worst ase senario when using two-way ommuniation,
Eve learns all positions where Bob assigned the wrong
bit-value. Therefore the Devetak-Winter bound ould
still be applied if one additionally announes Bob's error
positions. But sine Eve's knowledge about the key (12)
in the DR setting does not depend on Bob's measure-
ment outome βx, the resulting key rate would remain
unhanged. Therefore two-way error orretion methods
an be applied diretly in onnetion with DR methods
in the lossy hannel. In RR, however, strit one-way
ommuniation is essential. Sine we are here interested
in eieny onsiderations only, we ignore the problem
of nding a pratial one-way protool that an be as
eient as Casade and simply assume we have suh a
protool. Still, we have to keep in mind that the rate
for DR an be implemented diretly with known proto-
ols, whereas the RR rate requires the usage of eient
one-way error orretion protools.
For given transmission η of the quantum hannel and
exess noise δ imposed by Bob's detetor we
• hoose an amplitude α of Alie's oherent signal
states,
• alulate ∆Iprac(βx) for all information hannels βx
taking realisti error orretion into aount,
• disard all hannels where ∆Iprac(βx) < 0 in post-
seletion protools,
• integrate over the remaining hannels to obtain the
key rate G(η, α),
• start over suh as to optimize over α for a given
transmission η.
6FIG. 1: Comparison of the seret key rate G versus trans-
mission η for ideal (solid lines) and realisti error orretion
(dashed lines) for a postseleted DR protool and a RR pro-
tool. The dotted line represents a postseleted RR protool
with realisti error orretion.
VI. NUMERICAL EVALUATION AND
DISCUSSION
Let us rst neglet any detetor noise on Bob's side.
Fig. 1 summarizes our numerial results for the RR pro-
tool and for the postseleted DR sheme for the ase
that Bob's detetors are noiseless. If ideal error orre-
tion is assumed, the RR sheme learly performs better
than the postseleted DR sheme. In this setting, an
additional postseletion step in the RR protool annot
improve the performane, sine all information hannels
yield a positive advantage ∆IidealRR (βx) ≥ 0 for Alie and
Bob. The key rate for a non-postseleted DR sheme is
not shown, sine it would be limited by 50% losses and
is therefore not of interest for pratial QKD.
The key rate dereases signiantly in the non-
postseleted RR protools if one does not assume an ideal
error orretion. This is however not a problem of RR
itself, but due to the fat that in the simple approah all
bits have to be orreted. Sine one has to shrink the
key by f(e)Hbin(e) bits of information to orret a bit
oming from a hannel with error rate e in a realisti se-
nario, it follows that the usage of information hannels
with high error rate e eetively shrinks the key. Using
all information hannels would ompletely negate the ad-
vantage of non-postseleted RR versus postseleted DR
in a realisti senario. As a remedy, we propose to intro-
due postseletion of eetive binary hannels in the RR
protool as well. This ombination of the RR idea and
postseletion an help to give good performane with re-
alisti protools. The dotted urve in Fig. 1 represents
our numerial results for a postseleted RR protool.
Our results for imperfet detetors are summarized in
Fig. 2. Sine it is neessary to postselet the data in
FIG. 2: Inuene of detetor noise. Seret key rates G ver-
sus transmission η for ideal (solid lines) and realisti error
orretion (dashed lines) for a postseleted DR protool and
a postseleted RR protool are shown. The dashed lines in-
lude an exess noise of δ = 0.1.
the RR ase even in absene of detetor noise, we omit
the urves for the non-postseleted RR protool. We
nd that all investigated postseleted protools are ro-
bust against typial values of the detetor exess noise
δ. The dashed lines in Fig. 2 inlude a detetor noise
of δ = 0.1 and do not dier signiantly from the or-
responding urves in Fig. 1 whih inlude an ineient
error orretion protool but neglet noisy detetors. For
the RR protool, the eet of detetor noise is almost
negligible. As mentioned before, this is due to the fat
that the ost of privay ampliation χRR dereases in
the RR senario. This an partially ompensate for the
higher ost of error orretion.
In onlusion we nd that it is important to take the
inuene of ineient error orretion into aount in
evaluating QKD protools. We propose to ombine post-
seletion with reverse reoniliation to deal with losses
in realisti ontinuous variable QKD. It should be em-
phasized that eient one-way error reoniliation pro-
edures are essential to make this approah work. As a
fall-bak position, we an use the DR sheme with PS for
whih protools are available already today.
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